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FINITE-HORIZON PLANNING AND OPTIMIZING THE RATE OF SAVINGS 
This paper follows up the recent debate between S. Chakravarty and A. Maneschi 
[ 2, 3, 4] in the International Economic Review on "Optimal Savings with Finite Plan-
ning Horizon" with the following specific purposes: (1) To argue that, in spite 
of the arbitrariness involved in choosing the terminal capital stock, finite-hor-
izon planning makes more sense than planning with an infinite horizon. (2) To 
enquire into the nature of the time-path of optimum rate of savings in the model 
in question, particularly as regards the bearing of the elasticity of marginal util-
ity from consumption, 'v', on the question whether optimum rate of saving falls, re-
mains constant, or rises over time. While doing so, the non-disinvestment constraint 
suggested by Maneschi in [3] is not interpreted, as Maneschi rather artificially 
does, c:s imposing a lower bound on the choice of the terminal capital stock (as iden-
tified by the parameter 'g'); instead, the more usual and straight forward inter-
pretation of the constraint as one delimiting the set of feasible programmes given 
~ choice of 'g' is adopted. (3) To initiate, following the results obtained from 
(2) above, a discussion on social choice of the parameter 'v', without a meaningful 
rationalization of which optimum growth analysis may very well be regarded as a 
game in abstract theory only. 
1. The Case for Finite-Horizon Planning 
Neither Chakravarty nor anyone else has ever seriously presented the case 
for finite-horizon planning, and the general presumption in the theoretical lit-
erature has, it appears, remained against it. Now that Maneschi in particular 
launches a determined attack on it, it has become necessary to present the case 
for finite-horizon planning at its strongest. 
Notwithstanding the presumption that a nation lives for ever; planning with 
a finite-horizon makes more sense than infinite-horizon planning because neither 
1 
the production function nor the social welfare function can reasonably be antici-
pated for all times to come. 2 Estimation of the production function within a 
reasonable level of significance is possible only for some finite plan-period, 
However comprehensive (e.g., with technical change built in) the specification of 
the production function may be, it is a natural presumption to suggest that the 
margin of error from any estimation of the function would approach infinity as the 
time-argument approaches infinity. To put it differently, no estimation procedure 
exists that will give us the production function at "infinity" with any finite level 
of significance. Hence, any specification of the production function beyond some 
finite horizon would inevitably have to be arbitrary, and defensible only for ab-
stract theoretical investigations but not for seeking guidance for planning actually 
to be put in operation. 
Even assuming that the production function could have been estimated with 
reasonable accuracy for all times to come, or -- to think of a more credible 'if' 
-- even if one could agree to some particular specification as a working "null-
hypothesis'', social planners are neither in a position to know, nor to dictate, the 
other major argument in the issue, i.e., the utility function of society for all 
2 
times to come. The validity of any specification of the social utility function 
for any particular period of time must rest on the support, through the political 
process of the day (not excluding a dictatorial choice by the political authority 
of the day), of the generation living in that particular time. If this fundamental 
principle of "temporal democracv 11 is accepted, it follows trivially that the speci-
fication of the social utility function for any period beyond the lif~-time of the 
generation to which the decision-maker actually belongs is beyond the latter's jur-
isdiction. Nor is there any means available at present for anticipating the util-
ity function of societies yet unborn: there is no guarantee of any continuity in 
social decision-making as generations, governments, and key personalities in the 
decision-making offices change, amidst changes in the complex of national aspirations 
and international relations. 
Social planners with a holier-than-thou attitude might consider themselves 
nevertheless qualified to dictate the nature of social preferences for all times 
to come and thus set sside the principle of temporal democracy mentioned above. 
Even this would fail to salvage the case for infinite-horizon planning in the ab-
sence of any means of enforcing one's dictates on future societies: notwithstanding 
the dictates of today's social planners, future societies would behave, and dispose 
of their resources, exactly as they Hish, constrained only by the initial endowment 
of resources they are left to start with. 
Here is really the most crucial argument. For the type of aggregative planning 
being considered, the only way social planners of today can effectively constrain 
economic action of societies tomorrm~ is through the size of the terminal capital 
stock to be left for the latter. Thus it is pointless, if not inefficient, to as-
sume responsibility for the economic disposition of future societies beyond this one 
3 
single variable. 
Thus infinite-horizon planning, although fascinating as an abstract exercize, 
does not make practical sense, and the lack of a general interest in optimization 
over a finite planning-horizon in the theoretical literature is therefore to be de-
plored. It is heartening on the other hand to note that practical planners on the 
whole have re fused to be dragged to infinity and have stuck to finite-horizon plan-
ning without being the less wiser for this. 
This does not mean that finite-horizon planning is free from :its own difficulties. 
As Maneschi has already brought out, arbitrariness of a major nature must be involved 
in choice of the terminal capital stock subject to which optimization is to be at-
tained. 3 That it must be so should indeed be obvious, particularly when we note 
that choice of the terminal capital stock vitally affects two parties, so to say, 
'current' and 'future' generations, of which only one is truly represented at the 
decision-making table with a choice before it which is therefore admittedly awkward, 
But certainly the situation is not going to be helped by assuming that the p~rty 
present is in a position not only to decide on the amount of resources to be left 
for disposal by the other party, but also to dictate how the latter should dispose 
of the resources to be thus left for them! 
2. Time-Path of Optimal Rate of Savings and the Role 
of the Elasticity of Marginal Utility 
With the attack on the finite-horizon approach out of the way, we ought to take 
up more enthusiastically than ever the question of optimizing over a finite planning 
period, Neither Chakravarty nor Maneschi did really discuss this problem to a 
rounded completion, presumably because of their pre-occupation with the "sensitiv-
ity question". Specifically, the question of the optimum rate of ::;avin::;, tLe 
4 
title-issue of the whole discussion, remains untouched. In this section we shall 
be particularly concerned with this specific question. 
We shall use the non-disinvestment constraint that has been suggested by 
Maneschi in [ 3]. We however reject the Maneschi approach of implying from this 
that the choice of the parameter 'g' has got to be restricted in an area where 
this constraint is not binding: such a procedure is not logically convincing; 
rather it merely confuses what constitutes a feasible solution to the problem in 
question and what does not. If for lower values of 'g' than Maneschi's g* the so-
lution offered by Chakravarty in [1] violates the non-disinvestment constraint, all 
we need to do is simply to reject this as not constituting a feasible solution to 
the problem at all, and search for the best among solutions that~ feasible; it 
is not necessary to disturb the pre-determined character of the choice of 'g' and 
require it to be governed by the irrelevant consideration that the non-disinvestment 
constraint should not be binding on the problem postulated. 
Thus we keep the choice of 'g' entirely open in its whole feasible range, 
namely, anywhere between O and b, to be determined only by (admittedly arbitrary) 
value judgment of the social planners subj_ect to whatever political forces are pre-
sent to constraint this choice, a consideration totally exogenous to our model. The 
problem thus presented lends itself to a direct application of the "Maximum Princi-
ple" of Pontryagin and co-workers [5, Theorem 6]; the solution is identical, as it 
must be, to that obtained by Chakravarty [ l] following the "classical" method in 
the range of 'g' where the non-disinvestment constraint is not binding, i.e., when 
'g' exceeds or equals Maneschi's g*, but is different when 'g' is less than g*, the 
"classical" method failing in this case to provide the solution. 
We shall not elaborate the detailed derivation of the solution here, but merely 
present the final result for 'g' < g* in order only to complete the picture. 4 In 
5 
this case, the optimum time-path of capital stock consists of an initial "growth 
phase" when capital stock would be growing, and a subsequent "stationary phase" 
when capital stock would remain constant. Both phases are non-empty. During the 
"growth phase" consumption remains smaller than income but is growing, at the rate 
of b/v; during the stationary phase consumption equals income and remains constant. 
5 
When g_)g7', the solution is already known from Chakravarty, and it may simply 
be noted that there is no "stationary phase" in this case. 
We shall now take a closer look at the focus of our enquiry, viz., the opti-
mum rate of savings. It can be shown that the optimum rate of saving, which we 
shall call s*, (defined as the ratio of savings [= investment] to output), during 
the "growth phase" has the following general expression covering the whole range 
of admissible 'g' (during the "stationary phase" where it is relevant s* is of 
course zero): 
sir(t) = 1 - b(•--b)t v 
A IL +-
where A is given, when g< g*, by 1/- I 
-% 'L - J ' \.I 
(a). A e__, - -
V-/ 
1 
with 'L equalling the length of the "growth phase", 
c= V~1(::~e~: (b). A 
and, when g~g*, by 
) 
It is easy to see that s*(t) thus obtained must either monotonically fall, 
remain constant, or monotonically rise as t rises. From this it follows easily 
that if the "growth phase" falls short of the total length of the plan-period (i.e., 
when g(g*), s*(t) must be monotonically falling as t rises; for either a (non-zero) 
constant or a rising s*(t) means a growing capital stock, and hence output, and 
with this saving (investment) must rise further to give a rising rate of saving, 
so that the "growth phase" will be perpetuated and cannot come to a halt. The con-
verse is not necessarily true, however, and what remains to be considered is how 
s*(t) behaves over time in the case when there is no "stationary phase" (i.e., 
when g~g*). Here, the following interesting cases can be distinguished: 
6 
v <. 1: In this case il - $)t falls as t rises, and the relevant expression for 
A, given by (b), is positive; hence s*(t) falls as t advances. 
V/ 1: In this case 1 e(l - ;:;)t rises as t rises; on the other hand AL 0 
7 
according as g 7-; . Thus s*(t) falls, remains constant, or rises with rising 
t according as g ~ £. 
7v 
It may be noted that the quantity b/v is always greater than the quantity g* 
b 1 I - v 
as given by g* = ii + T log~ b(-1v,-1). where the second expression is negative • 
.e... - \I 
To put the above findings together, optimum rate of savings over the course 
of the "growth phase". always falls monotonically if 'v' is less than unity irre-
spective of the choice of 'g'; on the other hand, if 'v' exceeds unity, then op-
timum rate of savings falls, remains constant, or rises monotonically over the 
course of the "growth phase" according as 'g' is chosen to be smaller than, equal 
to, or greater than, the quantity b/v. Yet another handy way of putting the whole 
result together is to say that, given the choice of 'g', the optimum rate of saving~ 
monotonically falls, remains constant or monotonically rises according as 'v' is 
less than, equal to, or greater than, the quantity£. 
g-
3. Conclusion: Towards Rationalizing the Choice of 'v' 
This, we believe, brings the whole discussion to a more positive conclusion 
than where the Chakravarty-Maneschi debate left us. But this is only as far as pure 
theory goes. For relevance to actual quantitative application of such theory the 
pertinent question remains as to the choice of 'v', the elasticity of marginal util-
ity from consumption, on which the character of optimum programmes depends very cru-
7 
cially. So far, no meaningful rationalization has been offered for choice of this 
elasticity, which therefore remains the weakest point in the whole body of optimum 
growth studies. 6 It is time that more serious attention be given to this most dif-
ficult nonetheless the most important and fundamental question, if an explicit util-
ity function is to be used in actual quantitative planning in growing economies. 
By way of initiating serious thinking on this question, we suggest that the 
results obtained in the previous section with respect to the bearing of 'v' on the 
temporal behaviour of the optimum rate of savings be considered as a starting point. 
Suppose we pose the question this way: Given society's initial capital stock, and 
its choice of the terminal capital stock, there is a given amount of savings that 
must be generated during the plan-period to satisfy the terminal requirement. In 
what way should the burden of this "sacrifice" be distributed among the various 
"generations" that make up the plan-period in question? Presented this way, the 
question bears a strikingly close analogy to the very familiar question in Public 
Finance: given the total size of required taxes, how should its burden be distri-
buted between various sections of the community? Centuries of debates have brought 
us to an agreement at least about the general character of this distribution that 
l-<..S R.."t ui ·h:i \:i\e,_? 
is to be regarded~as embodied in the Principle of Progressive Taxation. Can we not 
apply this principle of inter-personal equity to the question of inter-temporal 
equity as well? If we can, then we really have quite an "objective11 guidance at 
least about the general character of distribution of the reqbired amount of savings 
among different "generations11 , for the Progressive Taxation is a revealed behaviour 
of societies as observed through tax-legislations of governments at least with re-
spect to direct taxation, and is at least a revealed faith even if tax-systems, taken 
as a whole, of certain countries fail to bear the Progressive character. 
8 
If it is permitted to borrow principles of equity from the interpersonal to 
the inter-temporal sphere, and apply specifically the Principle of Progression to 
the question of optimum savings over time, then according to the results of the 
previous section an "equitable" choice of 'v' is clearly indicated as greater than 
the quantity b/g (note that this necessarily means that 'v' should exceed unity); 
for only then will a higher rate of saving would be imposed (a higher rate of "tax-
ation", so to say) on later, higher-income "generations" than on earlier, lower-
income "generations 11 as the Principle of Progression would require. This gives 
us a lower bound for the choice of 1 v 1 , given the choice of 1 g 1 , a lower bound 
that rises as a smaller 1 g' is chosen, and vice versa. Since 'g' itself is a para-
meter in the choice of which considerations of inter-temporal equity (i.e., between 
plan-period and post-plan-period "generations") is involved, it is not surprising 
that an "equitable" choice of 1 v' happens to have some relation with the choice 
of 'g 1 : rather this is what one should expect for consistency. The inverse rela-
tion between the two has an easy interpretation: lowering the choice of 'g' implies 
in a sense asking less sacrifice from plan-period "generations" and r.1ore from post-
plan-period "generations" for any overall growth rate covering any length of time 
greater than the plan-period actually conceived; translating the same principle 
(i.e., of higher progression) for distribution of the burden of growth among the 
different "generations" ~vi thin the plan-period indicates a higher 'v' than otherwise. 
The above gives, of course, only a lower bound for a rational (equitable) 
choice of 'v', and hence a consistency rule of a very broad nature. It does not 
actually pin-point a rational choice of this social parameter that is crucial for 
objectively determining optimum saving rates for a growing economy. But the con-
siderations outlined above provides at least a basis around which debates about a 
more specific choice of 'v' can follow, and thus takes us one step closer to actual 
operational use of theoretical optimum growth analysis. It may particularly be 
worthwhile to try and see if specific choices of 'v' can be deduced, following 
the aforesaid analogy between inter-personal and inter-temporal equity, from 
specific rate-schedules of taxation that have found general acceptance in polit-
9 
ically conscious societies through years of mature social debates. 




l".:m1e::.chi [ 3 ] , p. 109. 
2
:sssentially this is an 11 uncertainty11 argument, and one may feel that the use of an 
"::.:~certainty discount" as is often assumed in the theory of individual decision-
r:_ ~~:ing, t3kes care of the issue without making it necessary to have a finite planning 
bo::::-i zon. This however J would be a confusion of issues, for two reasons: (1) uncer-
tc,i nty [:bout preferences of future generations is analogous only to an indicision .iri, 
y}le;s own mind in the case of an individual decision-maker about what he may desire 
in the future. Such uncertainty has hardly been handled in individual decision-making 
L!1~0~:v, and the only sensible way to handle it would be to have the individual con-· 
ce,:ned lea,·e an "adequate" provision for the future to "reasonably" accomodate what 
~~ raay desire later on when he does make up his mind; this would be an exact parallel 
tn leaving an "adequate" terminal capital stock for future societies in social deci-
sicn-making. (2) An "uncertainty discount" in any case discriminates against th~ 
.tu:~_lll,~· Such discrimination may be tenable for individual decision-making where dis-
c~irnination is made both for and against the same individual (one's own self), only 
at ~ifferent points of time; in social decision-making, however, such discrimination 
will., except for generations not very distant to each other through time, would l.?.YQ.;1;. 
:A:~~..£.f individuals in preference to another. As a matter of fact, in social de-
r:ic-ion-making, uncertainty about the future should give as much reason for having a 
_'1cc,;_.-::tive:: time discount (cf., Sen [ 7]) as for a positive one, and this intriguing ques-
tion would have to be settled before an uncertainty discount can be used in social 
decision-making involving the welfare of both current and future generations. 
3
w13t Maneschi has actually shown in Table 1 of [3] is that, in Chakravarty's model} 
,vi.th der.umulation permitted, there exists only an initial area of "insensitivity" 
·;hich must eventually give way to a later area of "sensitivity" while I g' is being 
:: __ n-:::eased. It may be addedJ to complete enquiry of the "sensitivity question", that 
(::) the size of the "initial area of insensitivity", which apparently misled Chakrav·· 
.:1:::::y into his rather sweeping "insensitivity conclusion" in [ ll, is inversely related 
to the parameter 'b', and realistic values ·of 'b' can be conceived which makes the 
former gic;e way to the "later area of sensitivity'well within the range of variation 
')f 'g 1 that Chakravarty himself considered; (b) more significantly, even the "initial 
'.1,.-e:i of insensitivity" disappears if optimum growth paths are subjected to the non-
::1isinvestment constraint, keeping the choice of 'g' open anywhere (unlike Maneschi). 
:.:t can be shown, by solving the problem properly under this constraint as suggested 
j_E section 2 of this paper, that optimum consumption paths are sensitive to variation 
in 'g' significantly and in important respects (in fact cutting one another on their 
wc1y::; ::o the plan-terminal for choices of 'g' in areas where the non-disinvestment 
sonstraint becomes binding on the problem). It is this, (b) that really refutes 
_1"'.haic .. .:warty' s "insensitivity conclusion" completely. Nevertheless, as it has been 
~rgued above, the basic finite-horizon approach taken by Chakravarty seems to be the 
only sensible approach to take. 
Footnotes (continued) 
4
The author has benefited from a discussion with Professor Ramesh Gangolly, now 
at the Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton, over the analysis of the "Pontryagin 
equations" for solving the above problem. Responsibility for any inadequacy in the 
analysis is, however, the author's alone. 
5An error in Chakravarty (1, p. 344], minor for his own purpose, by-passes the 
critical role of the qudntity b/v in determining the time-course of the optimum 
rate of savings: for 'g' exceeding b/v, 'R' is positive and not negative as Chak-
ravarty .thinks it always is. 
6 An attempt was made by Tinbergen in [8] to estimate 'v' empirically from revealed 
behaviour of individual workers. Apparently it is the Tinbergen estimate of • 6 
that was taken over by Chakravarty and has featured through his debate with Maneschi 
(if so, it must have been missed by Chakravarty that the translation of the origin 
by putting subsistence-consumption equal to zero, actually requires a transformation 
of Tinbergen's estimate, according to Tinbergen's formula in p. 482; thus it is not 
correct to say that C is a "mere translation factor" and 11 does not affect the maxi-
mization problem" as Chakravarty says in [ 1, p. 342]: it does, through specification 
of 'v' ). Apart from the questionable mixing up of issues ipertaining to individual 
optimization with those pertaining to social optimization over time, the present 
author has found Tinbergen's estimation to be arbitrary, as it depended crucially 
on the two particular consumption levels that he actually used to derive his esti-
mate (this has been discussed by the author in a separate paper [6], which shall 
be mailed to the reader on request). 
[l] S::hc1,i.·~v.r~y, S., "Optimal Savi..1gs with FinitL Planning Horizon", Internation .. :\ 
Economic. Review, Vol. 3, No, 3, September 1962. 
[ 2] .. -·--·----·--' 11 Optimal Savings ,iith 2inite Planning Horizon: A Reply", 
Interaational Economic Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1966. 
,-:~l 1-~Pn"'srhi, A.: "Optimal Savings with Finite Planning Horizon: A Note", 
In~~r~ational_EconoMic Revie¼, Vol. 7, No. 1, January, 1966. 
[~;} .... ____________ , "Optimal Savings with Finite Planning Horizon: A Rejoinder", 
r ; l 
r -, , 
I. i j 
:1;~~~~-n.'.ltional Economic Revie~, Vol. 7; No. 1, January, 1966. 
::01~1:ryagin and Others, The Mcithc:.natiec!l fuorv of Optimal Processes, Pergamon; 
1 qr I ." ... ,_,-'+' 
J.r: mT'1. H. A., "The Elasticity of. i'iarginal Utility in Optimum Growth Analysis 11 , 
(r:i11:eugra:Jhed), The Institute of Advanced Projects, University of Hawaii, 1966. 
S,c:n, ,\. J.'~,, "On Optimizing the Rate of 3aving", The Economic Journal, Vol. LYXI, 
11u .. 283, September, 1961. 
'.::'iube:::-gen, J., "Optimum Savings and Utility Maximization over Time," 
_::Cono~:retrica, Vol. 28, April 1960 .. 
APPENDIX 1: HATHEHATICAL NOTE TO SECTION Ill 
e=v 
1. The problen is to i.e., to minimize 
• 1-0 
(bK-K) dt, given 
1.1 K (t) = u (t), the control variable, to be chosen for each point of 
time within bounds r,iven by 
1.2 0 cu (t) c bK (t)~ 
1.3 K (o) = K)o, the initial conditior.; 
1.4 r(T) = r? = K • egT, the terminal condition, oc gc b; 
1.5 et l; in order for optimization to be meaningful. 
t'ithout loss of generality, let K=l, so that 
1.3a K (o) = 1 
1.4a K (T) = cgT 
2. By the 11aximum Principle of Pouteryagin et ol (Theorem 6), optimization 
requires u (t) to be so chosen as to r.iaximize the following Hamiltonian func-
2 tion E(K,u,t) at each point of time: 
2.1 H(K,u,t) =1 ~ e {bK (t) - u (t)}l-e +w (t) • u (t), where u (t) is the 
shadow price of investnent and is tine-continuous, and its novement 
through time under optimization is governed by the relation 
2.2 JH -e /, ~ = - - = -b (bK-u) "'-.0. JI~. 
3. It can be shoon that the llarniltonian l! is a concave function in u, given 
t and the time-path of K up tot and hence 1( (t). From this the following 
1 See acknowledgment, page 4n. 
Footnote 2 continued on next page. 
2 
* can be said straightway about optimun u (t) {henceforth u (t), denoting that 
value u (t) that naximizes the corresponcling Hnmiltoni function H (K,u,t)}: 
3.1 u*(t) = o if ancl only if Lu(K,u,t) /- < O and 
/, u=O 
3.2 u * (t)? 0 if and only if Hu (K,u, t)/ > o 
u=O 
3.1 may be said to give a ''corner solution", uhile 3.2 stands for 
the "regular" (classical) solution 
-e 3.2a Hu= t)i- (bK-u) = O. 
* for u (t), as given by 
'I; 
Note that u (t) never reaches the upper bound u = bK(t), for 
bK 
reaches bK. 
= t!J- oo, a negative quantity , so that H must vanish before u 
u 
4. He shall now prove the follmlinr: 
Theorem I: * . If u (t) 1B ever O. it is O the rest of the .plnn-
period. 
Proof: Consider the time-path of the derivative H (K,u,t) on the 
u 
plane u = O. Since K = u (by definition), I~ renains stationary on 
this plane. lience, the tine-derivative of H (K,u,t)/ 0 equals the u u= 
time-derivative of t)i alone (see 3.2a), and thus (see 2.2) is a negative 
quantity. 
Thus, on the plane u = o, the expression 1-1 (K,u,t) monotonically 
u 
falls as t increases. Hence, if for some t = t', Pe have H (K,u,t)/ 0 < 0 u / u= 
then 
Hu (K,u,t~,./u = o< O for all t > t'. 
2ForT!lally, the ;:aximun Prir,ciple only p,ives a set of necessary con-
ditions for optimum. In this particular problem, however, it should be 
easy to show that an optimum does exist (i.e., the solution space is com-
pact); it should also be easy to see that the relevant differential equa-
tion, given values of the relevant parameters, has only one solution. The 
two together insure sufficiency. 
3 
This combined with 3.1 proves Theorem 1. 
* 5. From Theorem 1, it follows that u (t) cannot be zero for t=O, for then 
the terminal requirement 1.4 cannot be satisfied. Hence, by 3.2, we must have 
" H (K,u,t) I O ) 0, i.e., u u= ,,,,-
t=O 
' -e ."' ·tjJ(O) - b _,,..,-0 (see 3.2a and 1.3a), or 
5.1 
-e ·, 
1/i(O) ;.,. b _,,/ O. 
It is also easy to see that Hu(K,u,t)/u=O is time-continuous, since 
1/J(t) is time-continuous. Hence 
Theorem 2: There must at least be an initial phase that is non-
1< 
empty. during which u (t) is strictly positive, and hence given 
by 3.2, i.e., ll (K,u,t) = O. 
u 
During this phase, capital stock would be growing with time, and 
accordingly we shall call this phase the 11growth. phase." 
* 6. From Theorem 2, we have u (t) = bK(t) -
1 
1 a during the "growth 
phase." Combining this with 2.2, we have t/J = -bt/1, whence t/J(t) = tjJ(O)e-bt. 
Hence, during the growth phase, we have 
* b t 
6.1 u (t) = bK(t) - B.e ""8"" where B = 
1 
1 
{t/1 (0) }8 
Equation 6.1 gives the optimum time-course of the rate of investment 
K during the "growth phase," yielding the general solution for optimum capital 
* stock, denoted by K (t), at each point of time during this phase as 
b t 





with initial condition 
Solving for c1 and c2 in terms of B, we obtain 






6.5 B1 (defined in 6.4b) ~ 0 for 8 ~1. 
6.6 
Combining 6. 2 with 6. 4, we have 
b t 
i' (t) = ebt + B1 (ebt - e1J ) during the growth phase. 
lt 
Note that 6.5 ensures that the expression B1 (ebt - e8 ) is always 
4 
negative, thus ensuring that the optimum rate of grmJth of capital is always 
less than maximum feasible rate given by the output-capital ratio Bconfirming 
a result we have already obtained in ~ection 3. 
7. There are now two possibilities: 
* (a) The "growth phase" covers the entire plan period. In this case u (t) 
is positive throughout, i.e., the non-disinvestment constraint is never bind-
ing. Thus, the optimum control is in the interior of the feasible region 
0 < u (t) ~ bK(t) for all tat least in the range O 2- t < T, and we have 
the so-called "classical solution" where the constant B
1 
fhence B) is 
determined by the original terminal condition 1.4. This solution is already 
5 
spelled out in Chakravarty (1), and we shall not repeat it here. 3 
(b) The "growth phase" stops short of the entire length of the plan-
period, and is followed by what may be called a "stationary phase" which 
runs through the remaining period (by Theorem 1). This we shall call the 
"non-classical solution," and, as it has not been covered either by 
Chakaravarty or by Maneschi, we shall look at this solution more closely 
below. 
Suppose we have a "non-classical solution," with the "stationary 
phase" starting at t = T<T. Then in order to satisfy the terminal require-
ment 1.4a, we ~ust have K*(t) = K(T) = egt for all tin the range T~t~ T, 
Specifically, 
7.1 * K (T) = gt e ' and this gives us the specific terminal condition to 
solve for B1 and hence for the differential equation 6.1. Combining 6.6 
with 7.1 we have 
7.2 gt e • 
* Furthermore, since the "stationary phase" begins at t = T u (t) must 
become zero for the first time at t = T, being determined up to this point 
* of time by the differential equation 6.1. Setting u (t=T) = 0 in 6,1 we 
]?_T 
have bK(T) = B.e 0 , whence 
7.3 
-_b.,. b:r ,, gt--
B = bK(T) • e 0 = be 0 
Combining 7.2 and 7.3, we have the relation 
3 
Sei:; page Sn. 
7.4 
hT e <P(t) = e + 
1 - e 
er,t-b("%-l) T - __..!__ egt = O, which provides the 
1 - e 
6 
solution for T and hence for the whole system in the "non-classical" situation. 
Obviously, if we have the "non-classical'' solution, then Tas given by 7.4 
must be less than T. It can also be shown that there is only one positive 
4 
value of T that satisfies 7. 4. 
8. We already have, from llaneschi in ( ), that the "classical" solution 
~'c 
satisfies the non-disinvestment constraint only for g~ g , where 
* g b 1 = - + - log 
8 T c 
e 
1-e 
b(l_- l)T e -· 
- e 
* Obviously, then, we have the "non-classical" solution for g< g • It 
can be shown easily that O <g*< b,
5 
so that we have (Theorem 3): the ranges 
of 'g' for which the classical and non-classical solutions occur respectively 
are both non-empty. 
* 9. Finally, the optimum rate of saving defined ass (t) = 
4 Since (a) <P(O) < O; (b) <f>(oo ) > 0 
b 
gt--8 T) 1 C - --1 - e 
ht 6 
{express <P(t) as e (1 + ~ 0 
-1 
and (c) <P (t) vanishes only once for T>O. 
t, 
* u (t) 
* bK (t) 
5Hint: show that e(b-g )T>l, so that b_>g, and also eg*T_;>-1, so 
*· that g /\ 0, for all 6>0 
7 
i<0 given by (fcom 6.1 anc~ 6.6) 
.,_ 
G .. ( t) ·· 1 -- - l 




0 D e-1 I e ' + --
\._ . . 0-1 
during the "gruwtL :'hase". For th:! non-classical solution, this gives us 
(see 7. 3) 
* s (t) .. 1 - l -------
-gT 1 
8 \ b(l-a)t 8 
- -8-1 ) C + 0-1 
For the classical solution, it can be shown {by putting K*(T)= egT in 6.6} 




s"(t) = 1 1 
bt -8h e - e 
bT gT 




APPENDIX 2: ESTITIATION OF I v' BY TINBERGEt; 
Tinbergen estimates 'v' by using Frisch's work on what Frisch calls 
the "flexibility of marginal utility, 11 ~r The concept of 'v' differs from 
the concept of 'w' in that the former refers to the elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to surplus (real) consumption t1hile the latter is 
concerned with real income. In the rough measurement of '.v' that Tinbergen 
attempts the distinction between real income and real consumption has 
apparently been ignored. Assuming that 'v' is constant for all magnitudes 
j 
of surplus consumption 'z' (c-c in Tinbergen's notation) so that~= v.c/c-c 
changes only as the ratio c/c-c changes, and assuming subsistence consumption 








, as follows: 
'cl - c2 \ 
v = (c
1




= 1 (American workers) and w2 = 3.5 (French workerS) and c1 = 2c2 , 
as assumed by Tinbergen, the above yields Tinbergen's estimate of 'v' as .6. 
,/ 
Since any pair of e's (and the corresponding w's) would yield one such 
estimate of 'v', this procedure of estimating 'v' would be valid only if 
the assumption of constancy of 'v' were empirically borne out, yielding the 
same estimate of 'v' from different pairs of e's except for rnndom variations. 
This, however, is not the case: estimation of 'v' for different pairs of 
-✓-
c 's with corresponding w's taken from Frisch's 1931 study shows a systematic 
variation of 'v' with respect to different such pairs. This is shown in 
Tables A and B. 
2 
Table A Table B 
'c' 'w' 'v' 'c' 'w' 'v' 
frOTTI consecutive from consecutive 
pairs of 'c' pairs of IC I 
75% 6.40 2.40 .617 
80% 4.52 .83 2,62 .559 .28 
a5z 3.55 .80 2.90 .510 .28 
90% 2.96 .77 3.17 .467 .24 
95% 2.55 .72 3.48 .428 .22 
100% 2.25 .69 3.80 .396 .21 
105% 2.03 .68 4.16 .362 .18 
110% 1.85 • 6l1 4.55 .333 .17 
115% 1. 71 .64 5.00 .312 .19 
120% 1.59 .60 5.40 .294 .17 
1251('. 1.50 .63 5.91 .278 .17 
1307, 1.41 .56 6.50 .261 .16 
135% 1.34 .58 
1407'. 1. 28 .57 
145% 1.22 .52 
150% 1.18 .60 
Table A shows the different values of 'v' that are obtained by pairing 
1 consecutive e's (and corresponding w's) given in the columns of Frisch 
as estimates from the Paris material, 1920-22; Table n 8ives the same for the 
U.S. material, 1918-19. In both these tables 'v' is seen to rise with 
significant consistency as lower and lower consumption levels are taken, giv-
ing a range from ,52 to .83 for Paris workers and from .16 to .28 for U.S. 
workers. If we assume that the lm,est U.S. consumption level represented in 
Table n was higher than the highest Paris consumption level represented in 
Table A, and also assume following Tinbergen that Paris and U.S. workers.had 
1Frisch, R., New Methods of Measuring l~arginal Utility, Verlag Von 
J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1932, pp. 32 and 64 (tables 2 and 5). 
3 
the same utility function, then the consistency in the variation of 'v' 
holds even if the two tables were combined. The monotonic rise in 'v' with 
fall in the corresponding levels of consumption gives us a reason to expect 
that 'v' would have exceeded unity if still lower consumption levels were 
investigated; this suggests that for consu1~ption levels pertaining in under-
developed countries with which most optimal growth studies are really con-
cerned, 'v' ,wuld in fact be greater than unity if it were to be empirically 
estimated, following the above procedure, from data more directly relevant to 
situations in these countries. 
The more important point that co~es out from the tables presented above 
is that an estimate of 'v' the uay Tinbergen does it would be as arbitrary 
as anything, depending as it uould so heavily on the specific pair of con-
sumption levels that are used for the estimation. This not only means 
that empirical justification for regarding 'v' as less than unity, always, 
is not established; it also means that the assumption of constancy of 'v' 
itself is not consistent with observed market behaviour of individuals. 
This does not necessarily compel us to discard the constancy postulate 
for 'v' in the social welfare function under study. The social welfare func-
tion does not necessarily have to be that directly consistent, if at all. wi~h 
revealed market behaviour of individuals or groups of individuals. If, 
however, the constancy potulate is retained, the possibility of estimation 
of the parameter 'v' from observed market behaviour would not be in the 
nature of things, and social choice of the value of this parameter has to 
seek its rationalization elsewhere. 
: I 
